


Collusion-resistant traitor tracing schemes

Final presentation of Thijs Laarhoven



irdeto

Contents

1. Introduction
2. Mathematical model
3. Previous results
4. The Tardos scheme
5. The improved Tardos scheme
6. The dynamic Tardos scheme
7. The universal Tardos scheme
8. The staircase Tardos scheme
9. Conclusion

Introduction: Illegal redistribution

Digital content is easy to reproduce, so it is easy for people who purchased copyrighted content to distribute it among non-authorized users.

Alice	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Bob	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Charlie	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Dave	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Eve	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Fred	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
George	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Forgery	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...

Since the content of each copy is the same, it is impossible to find out which of the users is guilty.

Introduction: Embed watermarks

Embed unique watermarks in each copy so that copies can be identified and traced back to the guilty users.

			w				w	w				w				w	w	w		
Alice	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	...		
Bob	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	...			
Charlie	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	...			
Dave	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	...			
Eve	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	...			
Fred	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	...			
George	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...			
Forgery	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	...			

This works only if it is hard to detect, edit or remove the watermarks.

Introduction: Embed watermarks

Embed unique watermarks in each copy so that copies can be identified and traced back to the guilty users.

			w				w	w				w				w	w	w		
Alice	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	...		
Bob	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	...			
Charlie	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	...			
Dave	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	...			
Eve	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	...			
Fred	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	...			
George	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...			
Forgery	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	...			

This works only if it is hard to detect, edit or remove the watermarks.

Introduction: Collusion-attacks

Colluders compare their copies, searching for differences. Since their data is the same, the differences must be part of the watermark.

			w			w	w				w		w	w	w		
Alice	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	...
Bob	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	...
Charlie	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	...
Dave	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	...
Eve	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	...
Fred	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	...
George	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Forgery	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	...
Forgery'	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	...

Colluders can then detect and edit that part of the watermark, making it hard to trace them.

Introduction: Traitor tracing schemes

Construct collusion-resistant traitor tracing codes. What makes the problem hard?

- If the watermarks are very different, then it is easy for colluders to detect and edit big parts of the watermark.
- If the watermarks are very similar, then it is hard to distinguish between users and get accurate accusations.

But using certain mathematical techniques, we can construct schemes resistant against collusion attacks: Even if the output is some mix of coalition codewords, we can identify (part of) the coalition.

Introduction: What do we want?

In general: Low cost, high efficiency.

- Resistance against all pirate strategies.
- Resistance against large coalitions.
- Short watermarks.
- Small alphabet sizes (large alphabet sizes impractical).
- Low complexity for accusations ($O(n)$ is ok, $O(n^2)$ is not).
- Avoid accusing innocent users.
- Find at least one guilty user (preferably more).

Model: Traitor tracing codes

Only focus on the watermarks, not on the data itself.

- Users: $j = 1, \dots, n$.
- Set of users: $U = \{1, \dots, n\}$.
- Coalition: $C \subseteq U$ of c colluders/traitors/pirates/attackers.
- Traitor tracing code: $\mathcal{C} = \{\vec{x}_j\}$.
 - ▷ Alphabet: $Q = \{0, \dots, q-1\}$.
 - ▷ Positions: $i = 1, \dots, \ell$.
 - ▷ Codewords: $\vec{x}_1, \dots, \vec{x}_n$.

The code $\mathcal{C}$ can also be represented in matrix form by $X_{ji} = (\vec{x}_j)_i$.

$$X = \begin{pmatrix} \leftarrow & \vec{x}_1 & \rightarrow \\ & \vdots & \\ \leftarrow & \vec{x}_n & \rightarrow \end{pmatrix} \text{ e.g. } X = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 2 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 1 & 3 \\ 3 & 1 & 2 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 2 \\ 3 & 3 & 2 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 2 & 2 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \in \{0, \dots, 3\}^{4 \times 7}.$$

A coalition generates a forgery $\vec{y}$ using some pirate strategy $\rho : X(C) \mapsto \vec{y}$.

Model: Pirate strategies

Marking assumption: If the whole coalition sees the same symbol $\omega \in Q$ on position i , then also $y_i = \omega$.

Further restrictions: If a coalition sees the symbols $\omega_1, \dots, \omega_c \in Q$ on position i (not all the same), then...

- Restricted digit model: $y_i \in \{\omega_1, \dots, \omega_c\}$.
- Arbitrary digit model: $y_i \in Q$.
- Allowing erasures: $y_i \in \dots$ or $y_i = ?$.
- Binary alphabet: All equivalent.

Most common: Restricted digit model.

Example:

$$\begin{aligned} X(C) &= \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 2 & \mathbf{1} & 1 & \mathbf{2} & 1 & 3 \\ 2 & 3 & \mathbf{1} & 2 & \mathbf{2} & 2 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \\ \vec{y} &\in \left\{ \begin{pmatrix} * & * & \mathbf{1} & * & \mathbf{2} & * & * \end{pmatrix} \right\} \\ \text{e.g. } \vec{y}_0 &= \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 3 & \mathbf{1} & 2 & \mathbf{2} & 1 & 3 \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

Model: Pirate strategies

Let $q = 2$, let $\omega_1, \dots, \omega_c$ be the symbols seen on position i , and let $0 < m < c$ be the number of ones seen by the coalition C .

- Random: $y_i \in_R \{0, 1\}$.
- Scapegoat: $y_i = \omega_j$ for some j .
- Always 0: $y_i = 0$ whenever possible.
- Majority voting: If $m < c/2$ then $y_i = 0$ and if $m > c/2$ then $y_i = 1$.
 - ▷ If $m = c/2$ then $y_i \in_R \{0, 1\}$.
 - ▷ If $m = c/2$ then $y_i = \omega_j$ for some j .
 - ▷ If $m = c/2$ then $y_i = 0/1$.
- Minority voting: If $m < c/2$ then $y_i = 1$ and if $m > c/2$ then $y_i = 0$.
 - ▷ If $m = c/2$ then ...
- Interleaving attack: $y_i \in_R \{\omega_1, \dots, \omega_c\}$ (so $\mathbb{P}[y_i = 1] = m/c$).
- ...

A scheme should be secure against all strategies.

Model: Static schemes

Construction:


1. Initialization
2. Send codewords
3. Coalition produces some forgery $\vec{y}$
4. Intercept forgery
5. Accuse certain users

Advantages:

- Many applications
- Only one codeword

Disadvantages:

- Catch only one or few colluders



Model: Dynamic schemes

Construction:


1. Initialization
2. Send first codewords
3. Receive first forgery
4. Disconnect certain users
5. Send new codewords
6. (repeat until no forgeries appear)

Advantages:

- Less total data needed.
- Catch all colluders.

Disadvantages:

- Fewer applications.
- Computations required during the broadcast.



Model: Deterministic vs. probabilistic

Deterministic schemes: No error.

- Always absolute certainty.
- Soundness: Never accuse any innocent users.
- Completeness: Always accuse at least one guilty user.
- Always alphabet size $q \geq c + 1$.
- Works only in restricted digit model.

Probabilistic schemes: Errors bounded by $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2 > 0$.

- Small probability of error.
- Soundness: Accuse no innocent users with probability at least $1 - \epsilon_1$.
- Completeness: Accuse a guilty user with probability at least $1 - \epsilon_2$.
- Usually soundness is more important: $\epsilon_1 \ll \epsilon_2$.
- Alphabet size $q \geq 2$.
- Works against any attack model.

Previous results: All schemes

First half of the project and report: Extensive literature study.

	q (alphabet size)	ℓ, t (codelength, time)
Deterministic, static	$q \geq c + 1$	$\ell \geq \Omega(c^2 \log(n))$
- Staddon et al.	$q = \mathcal{O}(c^2 k)$	$\ell = \mathcal{O}(c^2 \log(n))$
- Alon et al.	$q = c + 1$	$\ell = \mathcal{O}(c^2 \log(n))$
Probabilistic, static	$q \geq 2$	$\ell \geq \Omega(c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon))$
- Boneh and Shaw	$q = 2$	$\ell = \mathcal{O}(n^3 \ln(n/\epsilon))$
- Boneh and Shaw	$q = 2$	$\ell = \mathcal{O}(c^4 \ln(n/\epsilon) \ln(c/\epsilon))$
- Tardos	$q = 2$	$\ell = \mathcal{O}(c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon))$
Deterministic, dynamic	$q \geq c + 1$	$t \geq \Omega(\frac{c^2}{q-c} + c \log(n))$
- Fiat and Tassa	$q = 2c + 1$	$t = \mathcal{O}(c \log(n))$
- Berkman et al.	$q = c + 1$	$t = \mathcal{O}(c^3 \log(n))$
- Berkman et al.	$q = c + 1$	$t = \mathcal{O}(c^2 + c \log(n))$
Probabilistic, dynamic	$q \geq 2$	?
- Tassa	$q = 2$	$\ell \cdot t = \mathcal{O}(c^4 \log(n) \ln(c/\epsilon))$

Previous results: Probabilistic schemes

(probabilistic, $q = 2$)	ℓ (for small c)	ℓ (for large c)
Static schemes	$\ell \geq \Omega(c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon))$	$\ell \geq 1.38c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Boneh and Shaw	$\ell \approx 2n^3 \ln(n/\epsilon)$	$\ell \approx 2n^3 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Boneh and Shaw	$\ell \approx 32c^4 \ln(n/\epsilon) \ln(c/\epsilon)$	$\ell \approx 32c^4 \ln(n/\epsilon) \ln(c/\epsilon)$
- Tardos	$\ell = 100c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$	$\ell = 100c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Vladimirova et al.	$\ell = 90c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$	$\ell \approx 39.48c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Blayer and Tassa	$\ell = 85c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$	$\ell \approx 19.74c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Skoric et al.	(vague)	$\ell \approx 9.87c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Nuida et al.	$\ell \approx 5c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$	$\ell \approx 5.35c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
Dynamic schemes	?	?
- Tassa	$\ell \cdot t = \mathcal{O}(c^4 \log(n) \ln(c/\epsilon))$	$\ell \cdot t = \mathcal{O}(c^4 \log(n) \ln(c/\epsilon))$

New results

(probabilistic, $q = 2$)	ℓ (for small c)	ℓ (for large c)
Static schemes	$\ell \geq \Omega(c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon))$	$\ell \geq 1.38c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Boneh and Shaw	$\ell \approx 2n^3 \ln(n/\epsilon)$	$\ell \approx 2n^3 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Boneh and Shaw	$\ell \approx 32c^4 \ln(n/\epsilon) \ln(c/\epsilon)$	$\ell \approx 32c^4 \ln(n/\epsilon) \ln(c/\epsilon)$
- Tardos	$\ell = 100c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$	$\ell = 100c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Vladimirova et al.	$\ell = 90c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$	$\ell \approx 39.48c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Blayer and Tassa	$\ell = 85c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$	$\ell \approx 19.74c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Skoric et al.	(vague)	$\ell \approx 9.87c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Nuida et al.	$\ell \approx 5c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$	$\ell \approx 5.35c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Laarhoven (1)	$\ell \approx \mathbf{24}c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$	$\ell \approx \mathbf{4.93}c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
Dynamic schemes	?	?
- Tassa	$\ell \cdot t = \mathcal{O}(c^4 \log(n) \ln(c/\epsilon))$	$\ell \cdot t = \mathcal{O}(c^4 \log(n) \ln(c/\epsilon))$
- Laarhoven (2)	$\ell \cdot t \approx \mathbf{26}c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$	$\ell \cdot t \approx \mathbf{4.93}c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon)$
- Laarhoven (3)	$\ell \cdot t \approx \mathbf{26}c^2 \ln(nc^2/\epsilon)$	$\ell \cdot t \approx \mathbf{4.93}c^2 \ln(nc^2/\epsilon)$
- Laarhoven (4)	$\ell \cdot t \approx \mathbf{26}c^2 \ln(nc^2/\epsilon)$	$\ell \cdot t \approx \mathbf{4.93}c^2 \ln(nc^2/\epsilon)$

The Tardos scheme: Outline

Initialization:


- Take $\ell = \mathcal{O}(c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1))$.
- Take $\delta = \mathcal{O}(c^{-4/3})$.
- Take $Z = \mathcal{O}(c \ln(n/\epsilon_1))$.

Codeword generation:

- Generate $p_i \in [\delta, 1 - \delta]$ from $f(p)$.
- Generate X_{ji} using $\mathbb{P}[X_{ji} = 1] = p_i$.

Accusation: (after intercepting $\vec{y}$)

- Calculate $S_{ji} = S_{ji}(y_i, X_{ji}, p_i)$.
- Calculate $S_j = \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} S_{ji}$.
- Accuse user j if $S_j > Z$.



The Tardos scheme: Example

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2}$.

$X_{j,i}$	p_1	p_2	p_3	p_4	p_5	p_6	$\dots$	p_ℓ
Alice	$X_{1,1}$	$X_{1,2}$	$X_{1,3}$	$X_{1,4}$	$X_{1,5}$	$X_{1,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{1,1208}$
Bob	$X_{2,1}$	$X_{2,2}$	$X_{2,3}$	$X_{2,4}$	$X_{2,5}$	$X_{2,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{2,1208}$
Charlie	$X_{3,1}$	$X_{3,2}$	$X_{3,3}$	$X_{3,4}$	$X_{3,5}$	$X_{3,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{3,1208}$
Dave	$X_{4,1}$	$X_{4,2}$	$X_{4,3}$	$X_{4,4}$	$X_{4,5}$	$X_{4,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{4,1208}$
Eve	$X_{5,1}$	$X_{5,2}$	$X_{5,3}$	$X_{5,4}$	$X_{5,5}$	$X_{5,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{5,1208}$
Fred	$X_{6,1}$	$X_{6,2}$	$X_{6,3}$	$X_{6,4}$	$X_{6,5}$	$X_{6,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{6,1208}$
George	$X_{7,1}$	$X_{7,2}$	$X_{7,3}$	$X_{7,4}$	$X_{7,5}$	$X_{7,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{7,1208}$
Henry	$X_{8,1}$	$X_{8,2}$	$X_{8,3}$	$X_{8,4}$	$X_{8,5}$	$X_{8,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{8,1208}$

The Tardos scheme: Codewords

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2}$.

$X_{j,i}$	0.20	p_2	p_3	p_4	p_5	p_6	$\dots$	p_ℓ
Alice	0	$X_{1,2}$	$X_{1,3}$	$X_{1,4}$	$X_{1,5}$	$X_{1,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{1,1208}$
Bob	1	$X_{2,2}$	$X_{2,3}$	$X_{2,4}$	$X_{2,5}$	$X_{2,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{2,1208}$
Charlie	1	$X_{3,2}$	$X_{3,3}$	$X_{3,4}$	$X_{3,5}$	$X_{3,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{3,1208}$
Dave	0	$X_{4,2}$	$X_{4,3}$	$X_{4,4}$	$X_{4,5}$	$X_{4,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{4,1208}$
Eve	0	$X_{5,2}$	$X_{5,3}$	$X_{5,4}$	$X_{5,5}$	$X_{5,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{5,1208}$
Fred	1	$X_{6,2}$	$X_{6,3}$	$X_{6,4}$	$X_{6,5}$	$X_{6,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{6,1208}$
George	0	$X_{7,2}$	$X_{7,3}$	$X_{7,4}$	$X_{7,5}$	$X_{7,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{7,1208}$
Henry	0	$X_{8,2}$	$X_{8,3}$	$X_{8,4}$	$X_{8,5}$	$X_{8,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{8,1208}$

The Tardos scheme: Codewords

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2}$.

$X_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	p_3	p_4	p_5	p_6	$\dots$	p_ℓ
Alice	0	0	$X_{1,3}$	$X_{1,4}$	$X_{1,5}$	$X_{1,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{1,1208}$
Bob	1	0	$X_{2,3}$	$X_{2,4}$	$X_{2,5}$	$X_{2,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{2,1208}$
Charlie	1	0	$X_{3,3}$	$X_{3,4}$	$X_{3,5}$	$X_{3,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{3,1208}$
Dave	0	0	$X_{4,3}$	$X_{4,4}$	$X_{4,5}$	$X_{4,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{4,1208}$
Eve	0	0	$X_{5,3}$	$X_{5,4}$	$X_{5,5}$	$X_{5,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{5,1208}$
Fred	1	0	$X_{6,3}$	$X_{6,4}$	$X_{6,5}$	$X_{6,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{6,1208}$
George	0	0	$X_{7,3}$	$X_{7,4}$	$X_{7,5}$	$X_{7,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{7,1208}$
Henry	0	0	$X_{8,3}$	$X_{8,4}$	$X_{8,5}$	$X_{8,6}$	$\dots$	$X_{8,1208}$

The Tardos scheme: Codewords

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2}$.

$X_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	p_4	p_5	p_6	...	p_ℓ
Alice	0	0	1	$X_{1,4}$	$X_{1,5}$	$X_{1,6}$	...	$X_{1,1208}$
Bob	1	0	1	$X_{2,4}$	$X_{2,5}$	$X_{2,6}$	...	$X_{2,1208}$
Charlie	1	0	0	$X_{3,4}$	$X_{3,5}$	$X_{3,6}$	...	$X_{3,1208}$
Dave	0	0	1	$X_{4,4}$	$X_{4,5}$	$X_{4,6}$	...	$X_{4,1208}$
Eve	0	0	1	$X_{5,4}$	$X_{5,5}$	$X_{5,6}$	...	$X_{5,1208}$
Fred	1	0	1	$X_{6,4}$	$X_{6,5}$	$X_{6,6}$	...	$X_{6,1208}$
George	0	0	1	$X_{7,4}$	$X_{7,5}$	$X_{7,6}$	...	$X_{7,1208}$
Henry	0	0	0	$X_{8,4}$	$X_{8,5}$	$X_{8,6}$	...	$X_{8,1208}$

The Tardos scheme: Codewords

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2}$.

$X_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	p_5	p_6	...	p_ℓ
Alice	0	0	1	1	$X_{1,5}$	$X_{1,6}$	...	$X_{1,1208}$
Bob	1	0	1	1	$X_{2,5}$	$X_{2,6}$	...	$X_{2,1208}$
Charlie	1	0	0	1	$X_{3,5}$	$X_{3,6}$	...	$X_{3,1208}$
Dave	0	0	1	1	$X_{4,5}$	$X_{4,6}$	...	$X_{4,1208}$
Eve	0	0	1	0	$X_{5,5}$	$X_{5,6}$	...	$X_{5,1208}$
Fred	1	0	1	0	$X_{6,5}$	$X_{6,6}$	...	$X_{6,1208}$
George	0	0	1	0	$X_{7,5}$	$X_{7,6}$	...	$X_{7,1208}$
Henry	0	0	0	1	$X_{8,5}$	$X_{8,6}$	...	$X_{8,1208}$

The Tardos scheme: Codewords

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2}$.

$X_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	p_6	...	p_ℓ
Alice	0	0	1	1	1	$X_{1,6}$	...	$X_{1,1208}$
Bob	1	0	1	1	1	$X_{2,6}$	...	$X_{2,1208}$
Charlie	1	0	0	1	0	$X_{3,6}$	...	$X_{3,1208}$
Dave	0	0	1	1	1	$X_{4,6}$	...	$X_{4,1208}$
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	$X_{5,6}$	...	$X_{5,1208}$
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	$X_{6,6}$	...	$X_{6,1208}$
George	0	0	1	0	1	$X_{7,6}$	...	$X_{7,1208}$
Henry	0	0	0	1	1	$X_{8,6}$	...	$X_{8,1208}$

The Tardos scheme: Codewords

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2}$.

$X_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	p_ℓ
Alice	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	$X_{1,1208}$
Bob	1	0	1	1	1	0	...	$X_{2,1208}$
Charlie	1	0	0	1	0	1	...	$X_{3,1208}$
Dave	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	$X_{4,1208}$
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	$X_{5,1208}$
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	1	...	$X_{6,1208}$
George	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	$X_{7,1208}$
Henry	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	$X_{8,1208}$

The Tardos scheme: Codewords

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2}$.

$X_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18
Alice	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Bob	1	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Charlie	1	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Dave	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	1	...	0
George	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Henry	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0

The Tardos scheme: Coalition

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1-p)^{-1/2}$.

y_i	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18
Alice	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Bob	1	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Charlie	1	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Dave	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	1	...	0
George	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Henry	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0
Forgery								

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Coalition

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1-p)^{-1/2}$.

y_i	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18
Alice	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Bob	1	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Charlie	1	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Dave	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	1	...	0
George	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Henry	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0
Forgery	0							

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Coalition

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1-p)^{-1/2}$.

y_i	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18
Alice	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Bob	1	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Charlie	1	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Dave	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	1	...	0
George	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Henry	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0
Forgery	0	0						

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Coalition

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1-p)^{-1/2}$.

y_i	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18
Alice	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Bob	1	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Charlie	1	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Dave	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	1	...	0
George	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Henry	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0
Forgery	0	0	0					

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Coalition

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2}$.

y_i	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18
Alice	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Bob	1	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Charlie	1	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Dave	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	1	...	0
George	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Henry	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0
Forgery	0	0	0	1				

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Coalition

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2}$.

y_i	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18
Alice	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Bob	1	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Charlie	1	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Dave	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	1	...	0
George	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Henry	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0
Forgery	0	0	0	1	1			

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Coalition

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2}$.

y_i	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18
Alice	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Bob	1	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Charlie	1	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Dave	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	1	...	0
George	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Henry	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0
Forgery	0	0	0	1	1	0		

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Coalition

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1-p)^{-1/2}$.

y_i	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18
Alice	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Bob	1	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Charlie	1	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Dave	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	1	...	0
George	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0
Henry	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0
Forgery	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Scores

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2}$.

$S_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18	$\Sigma S_{j,i}$
Alice	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0	0
Bob	1	0	1	1	1	0	...	0	0
Charlie	1	0	0	1	0	1	...	0	0
Dave	0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0	0
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0	0
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	1	...	0	0
George	0	0	1	0	1	0	...	0	0
Henry	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0	0
Forgery	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0	

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Scores

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1-p)^{-1/2}$.

$S_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18	$\Sigma S_{j,i}$
Alice	+0.5	0	1	1	1	0	...	0	+0.5
Bob	-2.0	0	1	1	1	0	...	0	-2.0
Charlie	-2.0	0	0	1	0	1	...	0	-2.0
Dave	+0.5	0	1	1	1	0	...	0	+0.5
Eve	+0.5	0	1	0	1	0	...	0	+0.5
Fred	-2.0	0	1	0	1	1	...	0	-2.0
George	+0.5	0	1	0	1	0	...	0	+0.5
Henry	+0.5	0	0	1	1	0	...	0	+0.5
Forgery	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0	

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Scores

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1-p)^{-1/2}$.

$S_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18	$\Sigma S_{j,i}$
Alice	+0.5	+0.2	1	1	1	0	...	0	+0.7
Bob	-2.0	+0.2	1	1	1	0	...	0	-1.8
Charlie	-2.0	+0.2	0	1	0	1	...	0	-1.8
Dave	+0.5	+0.2	1	1	1	0	...	0	+0.7
Eve	+0.5	+0.2	1	0	1	0	...	0	+0.7
Fred	-2.0	+0.2	1	0	1	1	...	0	-1.8
George	+0.5	+0.2	1	0	1	0	...	0	+0.7
Henry	+0.5	+0.2	0	1	1	0	...	0	+0.7
Forgery	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0	

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Scores

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1-p)^{-1/2}$.

$S_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18	$\Sigma S_{j,i}$
Alice	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	1	1	0	...	0	+0.4
Bob	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	1	1	0	...	0	-2.1
Charlie	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	1	0	1	...	0	+1.0
Dave	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	1	1	0	...	0	+0.4
Eve	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	0	1	0	...	0	+0.4
Fred	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	0	1	1	...	0	-2.1
George	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	0	1	0	...	0	+0.4
Henry	+0.5	+0.2	+2.7	1	1	0	...	0	+3.5
Forgery	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0	

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Scores

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1-p)^{-1/2}$.

$S_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18	$\Sigma S_{j,i}$
Alice	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	1	0	...	0	+0.9
Bob	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	1	0	...	0	-1.6
Charlie	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	0	1	...	0	+1.5
Dave	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	1	0	...	0	+0.9
Eve	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	1	0	...	0	-1.6
Fred	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	1	1	...	0	-4.1
George	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	1	0	...	0	-1.6
Henry	+0.5	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	1	0	...	0	+4.0
Forgery	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0	

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Scores

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1-p)^{-1/2}$.

$S_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18	$\Sigma S_{j,i}$
Alice	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	0	...	0	+1.0
Bob	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	0	...	0	-1.5
Charlie	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	-7.2	1	...	0	-5.7
Dave	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	0	...	0	+1.0
Eve	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	0	...	0	-1.4
Fred	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	1	...	0	-3.9
George	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	0	...	0	-1.4
Henry	+0.5	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	+0.1	0	...	0	+4.1
Forgery	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0	

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Scores

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1-p)^{-1/2}$.

$S_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18	$\Sigma S_{j,i}$
Alice	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	+0.3	...	0	+1.3
Bob	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	+0.3	...	0	-1.2
Charlie	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	-7.2	-3.3	...	0	-9.0
Dave	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	+0.3	...	0	+1.3
Eve	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	+0.3	...	0	-1.1
Fred	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	-3.3	...	0	-7.2
George	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	+0.3	...	0	-1.1
Henry	+0.5	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	+0.1	+0.3	...	0	+4.4
Forgery	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0	

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Scores

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1-p)^{-1/2}$.

$S_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18	$\Sigma S_{j,i}$
Alice	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	+0.3	...	+0.5	+14
Bob	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	+0.3	...	+0.5	-19
Charlie	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	-7.2	-3.3	...	+0.5	+291
Dave	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	+0.3	...	+0.5	+29
Eve	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	+0.3	...	+0.5	+292
Fred	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	-3.3	...	+0.5	-53
George	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	+0.3	...	+0.5	-42
Henry	+0.5	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	+0.1	+0.3	...	+0.5	+269
Forgery	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0	

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

The Tardos scheme: Accusation

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1-p)^{-1/2}$.





$S_{j,i}$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	0.09	...	0.18	$\Sigma S_{j,i}$
Alice	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	+0.3	...	+0.5	+14
Bob	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	+0.3	...	+0.5	-19
Charlie	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	-7.2	-3.3	...	+0.5	+291
Dave	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	+0.3	...	+0.5	+29
Eve	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	+0.3	...	+0.5	+292
Fred	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	-3.3	...	+0.5	-53
George	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	+0.3	...	+0.5	-42
Henry	+0.5	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	+0.1	+0.3	...	+0.5	+269
Forgery	0	0	0	1	1	0	...	0	

$$C = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$

$$\sigma(\vec{y}) = \{\text{Charlie, Eve, Henry}\}$$





The Tardos scheme: Accusation

Let $n = 8$, let $c = 3$ and let the error probabilities be given by $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.01$. From the initialization we get $\ell = 1208$, $Z = 146.4$, $\delta = 0.0115$ and $f(p) = 0.368811 \cdot p^{-1/2}(1 - p)^{-1/2}$.




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The Tardos scheme: Why does it work?

Why are no innocent users accused?

- All codewords are independent, so it is impossible to frame anyone.
- The probability that a random walk exceeds Z is sufficiently small.

Why are guilty users accused?

- On undetectable positions, $S = \sum_{j \in C} S_j$ increases a lot.
- On other positions, pirates cannot decrease S by a lot. (Even if p_i is known!)
- If $S > cZ$ then at least one user is accused.

Note: Never guarantee of catching multiple colluders!

The Tardos scheme: Improvements

Suggested improvements:

- Use a symmetric accusation function. (Škorić et al.)
- Tighten the analysis in the proofs. (Škorić et al., Blayer and Tassa)
- Use the Gaussian approximation to estimate error probabilities. (Simone and Škorić)
- Use an optimal discrete distribution function $f(p)$. (Nuida et al.)

With the last optimization, one can achieve $\ell \approx 5.35c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1)$ for large c .

The improved Tardos scheme: Intro

Combine earlier improvements:

- Use a symmetric accusation function. (Škorić et al.)
- Tighten the analysis in the proofs. (Škorić et al., Blayer and Tassa)

Basically: Apply analysis of Blayer and Tassa to improved scheme of Škorić et al.

The improved Tardos scheme: Intro

Original Tardos scheme: No parametrization:

- Constant 100: $\ell = 100c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1)$
- Constant 20: $Z = 20c \ln(n/\epsilon_1)$
- Constant 300: $\delta = 1/(300c)$
- Constant $c/4$: $\epsilon_2 = (\epsilon_1/n)^{c/4}$

Proof of soundness:

- Constant 10: $\alpha = 1/(10c)$
- Constant 1.7: $\alpha/\sqrt{\delta} \leq 1.7$

Proof of completeness:

- Constant 1: $\beta = 1\sqrt{\delta}/c$
- Constant 0.25: $\frac{1-2c\delta}{\pi-4\delta'} + \beta c \geq 0.25$

The improved Tardos scheme: B&T

Blayer and Tassa's improvement: Full parametrization:

- Introduce d_ℓ : $\ell = d_\ell c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1)$
- Introduce d_z : $Z = d_z c \ln(n/\epsilon_1)$
- Introduce d_δ : $\delta = 1/(d_\delta c)$
- Introduce η : $\epsilon_2 = (\epsilon_1/n)^\eta$

Proof of soundness:

- Introduce d_α : $\alpha = 1/(d_\alpha c)$
- Introduce r : $\alpha/\sqrt{\delta} \leq h(r)$ (where $h^{-1}(x) = (e^x - 1 - x)/x^2$)

Proof of completeness:

- Introduce s : $\beta = s\sqrt{\delta}/c$
- Introduce g : $\frac{1-2c\delta}{\pi-4\delta'} + h^{-1}(s)\beta c \geq g$

The improved Tardos scheme: B&T

Theorem (Blayer and Tassa)

For $c \geq 2$ and $\epsilon_2 \geq \epsilon_1/n$ one can prove secureness with scheme parameters:

$$\ell = 81.25c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad Z = 14.15c \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad \delta = 1/(39.19c).$$

Theorem (Blayer and Tassa)

For large c one can prove soundness and completeness with scheme parameters:

$$\ell \approx 2\pi^2 c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad Z \approx 2\pi c \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad \delta \approx 0.$$

Theorem (Škorić et al.)

For large c one can prove soundness and completeness with scheme parameters:

$$\ell \approx \pi^2 c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad Z \approx 2\pi c \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad \delta \approx 0.$$

The improved Tardos scheme: Results

Theorem (Laarhoven, ...)

For $c \geq 2$ and $\epsilon_2 \geq \epsilon_1/n$ we can prove secureness with scheme parameters:

$$\ell = 23.79c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad Z = 8.06c \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad \delta = 1/(28.31c).$$


Theorem (Laarhoven, ...)

For large c we can prove soundness and completeness with scheme parameters:

$$\ell \approx \frac{\pi^2}{2} c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad Z \approx \pi c \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad \delta \approx 0.$$

The improved Tardos scheme: Results

Optimal codelength constant $d_\ell = \ell / (c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1))$, for $\epsilon_2 = \epsilon_1/n$ (top) and $\epsilon_2 \gg \epsilon_1/n$ (bottom).



The improved Tardos scheme: Summary

Small c :

- Codelengths more than 3.5 times shorter than Blayer and Tassa.
- Codelengths more than 2 times shorter than Škorić et al.
- Codelengths slightly longer than Nuida et al.

Large c :

- Codelengths 4 times shorter than Blayer and Tassa.
- Codelengths 2 times shorter than Škorić et al.
- Codelengths 1.08 times shorter than Nuida et al.
- Codelengths asymptotically optimal for this construction.

The dynamic Tardos scheme: Intro


Recall: Dynamic schemes:

- Distribution of i th symbol may depend on $y_1, \dots, y_{i-1}$.
- Ability to disconnect users at any time i .
- Possibility to catch *all* colluders.
- No good probabilistic dynamic schemes (until now...).

The dynamic Tardos scheme: Intro

Recall: Static Tardos scheme:


- Keep scores for each user.
- At time ℓ , disconnect users with $S_j(\ell) = \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} S_{ji} > Z$



The dynamic Tardos scheme: Intro

Dynamic Tardos scheme:

- Keep scores for each user.
- At each time t , disconnect users with $S_j(t) = \sum_{i=1}^t S_{ji} > Z$



The dynamic Tardos scheme: Outline

Initialization:

- Take $\ell = \mathcal{O}(c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1))$.
- Take $\delta = \mathcal{O}(c^{-4/3})$.
- Take $Z = \mathcal{O}(c \ln(n/\epsilon_1))$.

Codeword generation:

- Generate $p_i \in [\delta, 1 - \delta]$ from $f(p)$.
- Generate X_{ji} using $\mathbb{P}[X_{ji} = 1] = p_i$.

Distribution/Accusation: For each $t = 1, \dots, (\ell)$.

- Send t th symbols to active users
- Intercept y_t (or terminate if no pirate output)
- Calculate $S_j(t) = \sum_{i=1}^t S_{ji}$.
- Disconnect user j if $S_j(t) > Z$.

The dynamic Tardos scheme: Details

Soundness:

- Error probability increases by a factor at most 2.

Completeness (here: catch all colluders):

- Error probability increases by a factor at most $2e^s$.

Theorem (Laarhoven, ...)

For $c \geq 2$, $\epsilon_2 \geq \epsilon_1/n$ and $n/\epsilon_1 \geq 10^9$ we can prove secureness with scheme parameters:

$$\ell = 25.11c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad Z = 8.39c \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad \delta = 1/(27.18c).$$


Theorem (Laarhoven, ...)

For $c \rightarrow \infty$ the optimal values again converge to:

$$\ell \approx \frac{\pi^2}{2} c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad Z \approx \pi c \ln(n/\epsilon_1), \quad \delta \approx 0.$$


The dynamic Tardos scheme: Example

Example: $c = 3$, $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.001$ and $n = 100$. Parameters: $Z = 270.47$, $\delta = 0.0123$ and theoretically $\ell = 2285$. Strategy: Interleaving attack. Time needed: $t = 1137$.




The dynamic Tardos scheme: Example

Example: $c = 3$, $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.001$ and $n = 100$. Parameters: $Z = 270.47$, $\delta = 0.0123$ and theoretically $\ell = 2285$. Strategy: Minority voting. Time needed: $t = 1180$.



The dynamic Tardos scheme: Example

Example: $c = 3$, $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2 = 0.001$ and $n = 100$. Parameters: $Z = 270.47$, $\delta = 0.0123$ and theoretically $\ell = 2285$. Strategy: Scapegoat strategy. Time needed: $t = 1120$.



The dynamic Tardos scheme: Summary

Comparison with static Tardos scheme:

- Now certainty about catching all colluders instead of at least one.
- Still with high probability no innocent users are accused.
- Value ℓ only (rough) upper bound on time needed; usually $t \ll \ell$.
- Small c : Slightly higher values of ℓ .
- Large c : Asymptotically same codelengths.
- Code can still be generated in advance.
- Downside: Need to know c in advance.

The dynamic Tardos scheme: Summary

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- Code can still be generated in advance.
- **Downside: Need to know c in advance.**

The universal Tardos scheme: Intro

The Tardos scheme depends on c :

- Distribution f depends on δ and hence on c .
- Scores do not depend on c .


First idea: Generate p_i and X_{ji} using $u(p)$, and for scores for fixed c , simply disregard $p_i \notin [\delta_c, 1 - \delta_c]$. The values that are in $[\delta_c, 1 - \delta_c]$ are then distributed as $f_c(p)$ because $f_c(p) = K_c \cdot u(p)$.

$$u(p) = \frac{1}{\pi} \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{p(1-p)}}$$

Second idea: Run simultaneous dynamic Tardos schemes for each c , each using the same code $X_{j,i}$.

The universal Tardos scheme: Intro

Second idea: Run simultaneous dynamic Tardos schemes for each c , each using the same code $X_{j,i}$.



The universal Tardos scheme: Outline

Initialization:

- For each c , take $\ell_c = d_{\ell,c} c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_{1,c})$.
- For each c , take $\delta_c = 1/(d_{\delta,c} c)$.
- For each c , take $Z_c = d_{z,c} c \ln(n/\epsilon_{1,c})$.
- For each c , initialize a counter $t_c = 0$.
- For each c and j , initialize scores $S_{j,c}(0) = 0$.

Codeword generation: (independent of c)

- Generate $p_i \in [0, 1]$ from $u(p)$.
- Generate X_{ji} using $\mathbb{P}[X_{ji} = 1] = p_i$.

The universal Tardos scheme: Outline

Initialization:

- $\ell_c = d_{\ell,c} c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1)$, $\delta_c = 1/(d_{\delta,c} c)$, $Z_c = d_{z,c} c \ln(n/\epsilon_{1,c})$, $t_c = 0$, $S_{j,c}(0) = 0$.

Codeword generation: (independent of c)


- $p_i \in [0, 1]$ from $u(p)$, $\mathbb{P}[X_{ji} = 1] = p_i$.

Distribution/Accusation: For each $t = 1, \dots, (\ell)$.

- Send t th symbols to active users
- Intercept y_t (or terminate if no pirate output)
- Calculate $S_{j,t}$ for $X_{j,t} = 0/1$.
- For each c with $p_t \in [\delta_c, 1 - \delta_c]$:
 - ▷ Update $S_{j,c}(t) = S_{j,c}(t - 1) + S_{j,t}$.
 - ▷ Update $t_c = t_c + 1$.
 - ▷ If $t_c \leq \ell_c$ and $S_{j,c}(t) > Z_c$ then disconnect user j .


The universal Tardos scheme: Example

Keeping multiple scores per user:




The universal Tardos scheme: Example

Keeping multiple scores per user:




The universal Tardos scheme: Example

Keeping multiple scores per user:



The universal Tardos scheme: Example

Keeping multiple scores per user:



The universal Tardos scheme: Details

Soundness:

- Errors stack: Total error probability $\sum_{c=1}^{\infty} \epsilon_{1,c}$.
- Use e.g. $\sum_{c=1}^{\infty} 1/c^2 = \pi^2/6$.
- Taking $\epsilon_{1,c} = 6\epsilon_1/(\pi^2 c^2)$ gives $\sum_{c=1}^{\infty} \epsilon_{1,c} \leq \epsilon_1$.

Completeness:

- Success probability at least as big as in regular dynamic scheme.

Time needed:

- On average $\ell_c/(1 - \frac{4}{\pi} \arcsin(\sqrt{1/(d_\delta c)})) = \mathcal{O}(c^2 \ln(n/\epsilon_1))$ time needed.
- Probability of needing more time decreases exponentially.


The universal Tardos scheme: Summary

Comparison with dynamic Tardos scheme:

- Still high certainty about catching all colluders.
- Still with high probability no innocent users are ever accused.
- General algorithm: Can be applied for any coalition size.
- Code can still be generated in advance.
- Codelength/time slightly increases.
- Symbols always distributed using same $u(p)$.
- Only downside: Need to keep scores per user and per c .


The staircase Tardos scheme: Intro

Alternative to universal Tardos scheme: Staircase Tardos scheme:




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
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
The staircase Tardos scheme: Example

Alternative to universal Tardos scheme: Staircase Tardos scheme:



The staircase Tardos scheme: Example

Alternative to universal Tardos scheme: Staircase Tardos scheme:



The staircase Tardos scheme: Details

Soundness:

- Errors still stack: Total error probability $\sum_{c=1}^{\infty} \epsilon_{1,c}$.
- Taking $\epsilon_{1,c} = 6\epsilon_1/(\pi^2 c^2)$ again gives $\sum_{c=1}^{\infty} \epsilon_{1,c} \leq \epsilon_1$.

Completeness:

- Success probability still at least as big as in dynamic scheme.

Time needed fixed: After ℓ_c time, at least $1 - \epsilon_2$ chance of having caught the whole coalition.

The staircase Tardos scheme: Summary

Alternative to universal Tardos scheme: Staircase Tardos scheme:

- Update distribution of $f(p)$ after $\ell_1, \ell_2, \dots$
- Advantage: Keep only one score per user.
- Advantage: Always use all positions.
- Advantage: Slightly shorter (fixed) codelengths.
- Disadvantage: Distribution $f(p)$ depends on time t .
- Disadvantage: Less flexible for stopping/continuing tracing.

Conclusion

First half of the project:

- Extensive literature study.
- Report: Detailed analysis of many known schemes.
- Gap in literature: Probabilistic dynamic schemes.

Second half of the project:

- New result (2): Dynamic Tardos scheme.
- Problem: Which Tardos scheme to use? Blayr and Tassa? Skoric?
- New result (1): Improved Tardos scheme.
- Problem: Dynamic Tardos scheme depends on $c...$
- New result (3): Universal Tardos scheme.
- New result (4): Staircase Tardos scheme.

After the project:

- Paper 1: Improved Tardos scheme.
- Paper 2: Dynamic Tardos schemes.

Questions

Thank you for your attention! Any questions?

