

# Dealing with Specific Pirate Attacks in Collusion-Resistant Traitor Tracing

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# Outline

Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

Score-based construction

Fighting against specific attacks

Results

Conclusion

# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

## Illegal redistribution

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User	Copyrighted content																
Antonino	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Boris	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Caroline	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
David	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Eve	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Fred	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Gábor	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Henry	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...

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# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

## Illegal redistribution

User	Copyrighted content																
Antonino	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Boris	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Caroline	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
David	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Eve	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Fred	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Gábor	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Henry	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Copy	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...

# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

## Embedding fingerprints

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User	Copyrighted content (fingerprinted)															
Antonino	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	...
Boris	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	...
Caroline	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	...
David	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	...
Eve	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	...
Fred	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	...
Gábor	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	...
Henry	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	...

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# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

## Embedding fingerprints

User	Copyrighted content (fingerprinted)																
Antonino	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	...
Boris	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	...
Caroline	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	...
David	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	...
Eve	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	...
Fred	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	...
Gábor	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Henry	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	...
Copy	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	...

## Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

## Embedding fingerprints

User	Copyrighted content (fingerprinted)																
Antonino	0	1	<b>1</b>	1	0	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...
Boris	0	1	<b>1</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	0	...
Caroline	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>0</b>	1	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	0	...
David	0	1	<b>1</b>	1	0	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...
Eve	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...
Fred	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	<b>0</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...
Gábor	0	1	<b>1</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	0	...
Henry	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	<b>0</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	0	...
Copy	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...

# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

## Embedding fingerprints

User	Copyrighted content (fingerprinted)																
Antonino	0	1	<b>1</b>	1	0	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...
Boris	0	1	<b>1</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	0	...
Caroline	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>0</b>	1	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	0	...
David	0	1	<b>1</b>	1	0	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...
Eve	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...
Fred	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	<b>0</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...
Gábor	0	1	<b>1</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	0	...
Henry	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	<b>0</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	0	...
Copy	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...



# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

## Collusion attacks

User	Copyrighted content (fingerprinted)																
Antonino	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	...
Boris	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	...
Caroline	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	...
David	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	...
Eve	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	...
Fred	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	...
Gábor	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Henry	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	...

# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

## Collusion attacks

User	Copyrighted content (fingerprinted)																
Antonino	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	...
Boris	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	...
Caroline	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	...
David	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	...
Eve	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	...
Fred	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	...
Gábor	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	...
Henry	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	...
Copy	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	...

# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

## Collusion attacks

User	Copyrighted content (fingerprinted)																
Antonino	0	1	<b>1</b>	1	0	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...
Boris	0	1	<b>1</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	0	...
Caroline	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>0</b>	1	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	0	...
David	0	1	<b>1</b>	1	0	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...
Eve	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...
Fred	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	<b>0</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...
Gábor	0	1	<b>1</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	0	...
Henry	0	1	<b>0</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	<b>0</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	0	...
Copy	0	1	<b>1</b>	1	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	<b>1</b>	1	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	0	...

# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

Schemes resistant against collusion attacks

User	Copyrighted content (fingerprinted)																
Antonino	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Boris	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Caroline	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
David	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Eve	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Fred	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Gábor	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Henry	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Copy	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...

# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

Schemes resistant against collusion attacks

User	Copyrighted content (fingerprinted)																
Antonino	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Boris	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Caroline	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
David	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Eve	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Fred	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Gábor	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Henry	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Copy	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes

# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

Schemes resistant against collusion attacks

User	Copyrighted content (fingerprinted)																
Antonino	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Boris	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Caroline	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
David	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Eve	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Fred	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Gábor	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Henry	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...
Copy	0	1	?	1	0	?	?	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	?	0	...

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders

# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

Schemes resistant against collusion attacks

User	Copyrighted content (fingerprinted)				
Antonino	?	? ?	?	? ? ?	...
Boris	?	? ?	?	? ? ?	...
Caroline	?	? ?	?	? ? ?	...
David	?	? ?	?	? ? ?	...
Eve	?	? ?	?	? ? ?	...
Fred	?	? ?	?	? ? ?	...
Gábor	?	? ?	?	? ? ?	...
Henry	?	? ?	?	? ? ?	...
Copy	?	? ?	?	? ? ?	...

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders

# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

Schemes resistant against collusion attacks

User	Copyrighted content (fingerprinted)		
Antonino		...	
Boris		...	
Caroline		...	
David	$X \in \{0, 1\}^{n \times \ell}$	...	
Eve		...	
Fred		...	
Gábor		...	
Henry		...	
Copy		$y \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell}$	...

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders



# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

Schemes resistant against collusion attacks

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders

# Collusion-resistant traitor tracing

Schemes resistant against collusion attacks

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders

# Score-based construction

## Overview

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders

# Score-based construction

## Overview

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \sim F$ .
    - ▶ Many values of  $p_i$  close to 0 and 1.
    - ▶ Hide choice of  $p_i$  from pirates.
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders

# Score-based construction

## Overview

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \sim F$ .
    - ▶ Many values of  $p_i$  close to 0 and 1.
    - ▶ Hide choice of  $p_i$  from pirates.
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders

# Score-based construction

## Overview

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \sim F$ .
    - ▶ Many values of  $p_i$  close to 0 and 1.
    - ▶ Hide choice of  $p_i$  from pirates.
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .
    - ▶ Positive scores ( $S_{j,i} > 0$ ) for matches ( $X_{j,i} = y_i$ ).
    - ▶ Negative scores ( $S_{j,i} < 0$ ) for differences ( $X_{j,i} \neq y_i$ ).
    - ▶ Large scores ( $|S_{j,i}| \gg 0$ ) for rare events.

# Score-based construction

## Overview

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \sim F$ .
    - ▶ Many values of  $p_i$  close to 0 and 1.
    - ▶ Hide choice of  $p_i$  from pirates.
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .
    - ▶ Positive scores ( $S_{j,i} > 0$ ) for matches ( $X_{j,i} = y_i$ ).
    - ▶ Negative scores ( $S_{j,i} < 0$ ) for differences ( $X_{j,i} \neq y_i$ ).
    - ▶ Large scores ( $|S_{j,i}| \gg 0$ ) for rare events.
  - 2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

## Score-based construction

## Codewords

$p_i$	$p_1$	$p_2$	$p_3$	$p_4$	$p_5$	$\dots$	$p_{1208}$
Antonino	$X_{1,1}$	$X_{1,2}$	$X_{1,3}$	$X_{1,4}$	$X_{1,5}$	$\dots$	$X_{1,1208}$
Boris	$X_{2,1}$	$X_{2,2}$	$X_{2,3}$	$X_{2,4}$	$X_{2,5}$	$\dots$	$X_{2,1208}$
Caroline	$X_{3,1}$	$X_{3,2}$	$X_{3,3}$	$X_{3,4}$	$X_{3,5}$	$\dots$	$X_{3,1208}$
David	$X_{4,1}$	$X_{4,2}$	$X_{4,3}$	$X_{4,4}$	$X_{4,5}$	$\dots$	$X_{4,1208}$
Eve	$X_{5,1}$	$X_{5,2}$	$X_{5,3}$	$X_{5,4}$	$X_{5,5}$	$\dots$	$X_{5,1208}$
Fred	$X_{6,1}$	$X_{6,2}$	$X_{6,3}$	$X_{6,4}$	$X_{6,5}$	$\dots$	$X_{6,1208}$
Gábor	$X_{7,1}$	$X_{7,2}$	$X_{7,3}$	$X_{7,4}$	$X_{7,5}$	$\dots$	$X_{7,1208}$
Henry	$X_{8,1}$	$X_{8,2}$	$X_{8,3}$	$X_{8,4}$	$X_{8,5}$	$\dots$	$X_{8,1208}$
Copy	$y_1$	$y_2$	$y_3$	$y_4$	$y_5$	$\dots$	$y_{1208}$



## Score-based construction

## Codewords

1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \sim F$ .

$p_i$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	...	0.18
Antonino	$X_{1,1}$	$X_{1,2}$	$X_{1,3}$	$X_{1,4}$	$X_{1,5}$	...	$X_{1,1208}$
Boris	$X_{2,1}$	$X_{2,2}$	$X_{2,3}$	$X_{2,4}$	$X_{2,5}$	...	$X_{2,1208}$
Caroline	$X_{3,1}$	$X_{3,2}$	$X_{3,3}$	$X_{3,4}$	$X_{3,5}$	...	$X_{3,1208}$
David	$X_{4,1}$	$X_{4,2}$	$X_{4,3}$	$X_{4,4}$	$X_{4,5}$	...	$X_{4,1208}$
Eve	$X_{5,1}$	$X_{5,2}$	$X_{5,3}$	$X_{5,4}$	$X_{5,5}$	...	$X_{5,1208}$
Fred	$X_{6,1}$	$X_{6,2}$	$X_{6,3}$	$X_{6,4}$	$X_{6,5}$	...	$X_{6,1208}$
Gábor	$X_{7,1}$	$X_{7,2}$	$X_{7,3}$	$X_{7,4}$	$X_{7,5}$	...	$X_{7,1208}$
Henry	$X_{8,1}$	$X_{8,2}$	$X_{8,3}$	$X_{8,4}$	$X_{8,5}$	...	$X_{8,1208}$
Copy	$y_1$	$y_2$	$y_3$	$y_4$	$y_5$	...	$y_{1208}$

## Score-based construction

## Codewords

1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .

$p_i$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	...	0.18
Antonino	0	0	1	1	1	...	0
Boris	1	0	1	1	1	...	1
Caroline	1	0	0	1	0	...	0
David	0	0	1	1	1	...	0
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	...	0
Gábor	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Henry	1	0	0	0	1	...	0
Copy	$y_1$	$y_2$	$y_3$	$y_4$	$y_5$	...	$y_{1208}$

## Score-based construction

## Coalition

Pirates get their versions, ...

$p_i$	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Antonino	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Boris	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Caroline	1	0	0	1	0	...	0
David	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Fred	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Gábor	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Henry	1	0	0	0	1	...	0
Copy	$y_1$	$y_2$	$y_3$	$y_4$	$y_5$	...	$y_{1208}$

$$\text{Coalition} = \{\text{Caroline}, \text{Eve}, \text{Henry}\}$$

## Score-based construction

## Coalition

Pirates get their versions, compare them ...

$p_i$	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Antonino	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Boris	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Caroline	<b>1</b>	0	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	...	0
David	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Eve	<b>0</b>	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	...	0
Fred	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Gábor	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Henry	<b>1</b>	0	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	...	0
Copy	$y_1$	$y_2$	$y_3$	$y_4$	$y_5$	...	$y_{1208}$

$$\text{Coalition} = \{\text{Caroline, Eve, Henry}\}$$

## Score-based construction

## Coalition

Pirates get their versions, compare them and make a copy.

$p_i$	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Antonino	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Boris	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Caroline	<b>1</b>	0	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	...	0
David	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Eve	<b>0</b>	0	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	...	0
Fred	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Gábor	.	.	.	.	.	...	.
Henry	<b>1</b>	0	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	...	0
Copy	<b>0</b>	0	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	...	0

$$\text{Coalition} = \{\text{Caroline}, \text{Eve}, \text{Henry}\}$$

## Score-based construction

## Scores

The copy is distributed and detected by the tracer.

$p_i$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	...	0.18
Antonino	0	0	1	1	1	...	0
Boris	1	0	1	1	1	...	1
Caroline	1	0	0	1	0	...	0
David	0	0	1	1	1	...	0
Eve	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Fred	1	0	1	0	1	...	0
Gábor	0	0	1	0	1	...	0
Henry	1	0	0	0	1	...	0
Copy	0	0	0	1	1	...	0

Coalition = {Caroline, Eve, Henry}

## Score-based construction

## Scores

2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .

$p_i$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	...	0.18
Antonino	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	...	+0.5
Boris	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	...	-2.1
Caroline	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	-7.2	...	+0.5
David	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	...	+0.5
Eve	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5
Fred	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5
Gábor	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5
Henry	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5
Copy	0	0	0	1	1	...	0

Coalition = {Caroline, Eve, Henry}

## Score-based construction

## Scores

2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

$p_i$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	...	0.18	$\sum_i S_{j,i}$
Antonino	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	...	+0.5	0
Boris	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	...	-2.1	0
Caroline	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	-7.2	...	+0.5	0
David	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	...	+0.5	0
Eve	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5	0
Fred	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5	0
Gábor	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5	0
Henry	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5	0
Copy	0	0	0	1	1	...	0	

Coalition = {Caroline, Eve, Henry}



## Score-based construction

## Scores

2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

$p_i$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	...	0.18	$\sum_i S_{j,i}$
Antonino	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	...	+0.5	+14
Boris	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	...	-2.1	-19
Caroline	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	-7.2	...	+0.5	+291
David	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	...	+0.5	+29
Eve	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5	+292
Fred	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5	-53
Gábor	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5	-42
Henry	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5	+269
Copy	0	0	0	1	1	...	0	

Coalition = {Caroline, Eve, Henry}

## Score-based construction

## Scores

2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

$p_i$	0.20	0.05	0.88	0.79	0.98	...	0.18	$\sum_i S_{j,i}$
Antonino	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	...	+0.5	+14
Boris	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	...	-2.1	-19
Caroline	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	+0.5	-7.2	...	+0.5	+291
David	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	+0.5	+0.1	...	+0.5	+29
Eve	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5	+292
Fred	-2.0	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5	-53
Gábor	+0.5	+0.2	-0.4	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5	-42
Henry	-2.0	+0.2	+2.7	-1.9	+0.1	...	+0.5	+269
Copy	0	0	0	1	1	...	0	

Coalition = {Caroline, Eve, Henry}

Accused = {Caroline, Eve, Henry}

# Score-based construction

## Overview

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \sim F$ .
    - ▶ Many values of  $p_i$  close to 0 and 1.
    - ▶ Hide choice of  $p_i$  from pirates.
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .
    - ▶ Positive scores ( $S_{j,i} > 0$ ) for matches ( $X_{j,i} = y_i$ ).
    - ▶ Negative scores ( $S_{j,i} < 0$ ) for differences ( $X_{j,i} \neq y_i$ ).
    - ▶ Large scores ( $|S_{j,i}| \gg 0$ ) for rare events.
  - 2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

# Score-based construction

## Overview

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \sim F$ .
    - ▶ Many values of  $p_i$  close to 0 and 1.
    - ▶ Hide choice of  $p_i$  from pirates.
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .
    - ▶ Positive scores ( $S_{j,i} > 0$ ) for matches ( $X_{j,i} = y_i$ ).
    - ▶ Negative scores ( $S_{j,i} < 0$ ) for differences ( $X_{j,i} \neq y_i$ ).
    - ▶ Large scores ( $|S_{j,i}| \gg 0$ ) for rare events.
  - 2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

What does the code length become when we optimize  $F$  and  $g$ ?

# Fighting against specific attacks

## Arbitrary attacks

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \sim F(p_i) = \frac{2}{\pi} \arcsin \sqrt{p_i}$ .
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .

$$g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i) = \begin{cases} +p/(1-p) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 0) \\ -1 & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 1) \\ -1 & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 0) \\ +(1-p)/p & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 1) \end{cases}$$

- 2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is "large".

$$\ell \sim 2c^2 \ln n$$

# Fighting against specific attacks

## The interleaving attack

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \sim F(p_i) = \frac{2}{\pi} \arcsin \sqrt{p_i}$ .
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .

$$g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i) = \begin{cases} +p/(1-p) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 0) \\ -1 & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 1) \\ -1 & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 0) \\ +(1-p)/p & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 1) \end{cases}$$

- 2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

$$\ell \sim 2c^2 \ln n$$

# Fighting against specific attacks

## The all-1 attack

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \sim F(p_i) = \frac{2}{\pi} \arcsin \sqrt{p_i}$ .
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .

$$g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i) = \begin{cases} +p/(1-p) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 0) \\ -p(1-p)^{c-1}/(1-(1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 1) \\ -1 & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 0) \\ +(1-p)^c/(1-(1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 1) \end{cases}$$

- 2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

$$\ell = O(c^{1.5} \ln n)$$

# Fighting against specific attacks

## The all-1 attack

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \equiv p = O(1/c)$ .
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .

$$g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i) = \begin{cases} +p/(1-p) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 0) \\ -p(1-p)^{c-1}/(1-(1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 1) \\ -\infty & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 0) \\ +(1-p)^c/(1-(1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 1) \end{cases}$$

- 2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

$$\ell \sim 2c \ln n$$



# Fighting against specific attacks

## The minority voting attack

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \sim F(p_i) = \frac{2}{\pi} \arcsin \sqrt{p_i}$ .
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .

$$g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i) \approx \begin{cases} + \dots & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 0) \\ - \dots & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 1) \\ - \dots & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 0) \\ + \dots & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 1) \end{cases}$$

- 2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

$$\ell = O(c^{1.5} \ln n)$$

# Fighting against specific attacks

## The minority voting attack

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \equiv p = O(1/c)$ .
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .

$$g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i) \approx \begin{cases} +p/(1-p) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 0) \\ -p(1-p)^{c-1}/(1-(1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 1) \\ -1 & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 0) \\ +(1-p)^c/(1-(1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 1) \end{cases}$$

- 2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

$$\ell \sim 2c \ln n$$

# Fighting against specific attacks

## The majority voting attack

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \sim F(p_i) = \frac{2}{\pi} \arcsin \sqrt{p_i}$ .
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .

$$g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i) = \begin{cases} + \dots & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 0) \\ - \dots & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 1) \\ - \dots & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 0) \\ + \dots & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 1) \end{cases}$$

- 2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

$$\ell = O(c^{1.5} \ln n)$$

# Fighting against specific attacks

## The majority voting attack

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \equiv p = 1/2$ .
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .

$$g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i) = \begin{cases} +1 & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 0) \\ -1 & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 1) \\ -1 & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 0) \\ +1 & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 1) \end{cases}$$

- 2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

$$\ell \sim \pi c \ln n$$

# Fighting against specific attacks

## The coin-flip attack

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \sim F(p_i) = \frac{2}{\pi} \arcsin \sqrt{p_i}$ .
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .

$$g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i) = (p^{c-1} + (1-p)^{c-1})$$

$$\times \begin{cases} +p/(1-p^c + (1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 0) \\ -p/(1+p^c - (1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 1) \\ -(1-p)/(1-p^c + (1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 0) \\ +(1-p)/(1+p^c - (1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 1) \end{cases}$$

- 2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

$$\ell = O(c^{1.5} \ln n)$$

# Fighting against specific attacks

## The coin-flip attack

1. An algorithm to construct collusion-resistant codes
  - 1a. For each segment  $i$ , generate  $p_i \equiv p = O(1/c)$ .
  - 1b. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , choose  $X_{j,i} = 1$  with prob.  $p_i$ .
2. An algorithm to trace pirate copies to colluders
  - 2a. For each segment  $i$ , user  $j$ , calculate  $S_{j,i} = g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i)$ .

$$g(X_{j,i}, y_i, p_i) = \left( p^{c-1} + (1-p)^{c-1} \right)$$

$$\times \begin{cases} +p/(1-p^c + (1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 0) \\ -p/(1+p^c - (1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (0, 1) \\ -(1-p)/(1-p^c + (1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 0) \\ +(1-p)/(1+p^c - (1-p)^c) & (X_{j,i}, y_i) = (1, 1) \end{cases}$$

- 2b. For each user  $j$ , accuse user  $j$  iff  $\sum_i S_{j,i}$  is “large”.

$$\ell \sim 4c \ln n$$

# Results

## The Tardos scheme

Table: Asymptotics of  $L = \frac{\ell}{\ln n}$  for large  $n$ .

	Efficient constr.		Lower bounds	
Arbitrary attacks	$100c^2$	[Tar'03]	$\Omega(c^2)$	[Tar'03]
Interleaving attack	$100c^2$	[Tar'03]	$\Omega(c)$	
All-1 attack	$100c^2$	[Tar'03]	$\Omega(c)$	
Minority voting	$100c^2$	[Tar'03]	$\Omega(c)$	
Majority voting	$100c^2$	[Tar'03]	$\Omega(c)$	
Coin-flip attack	$100c^2$	[Tar'03]	$\Omega(c)$	

# Results

## Improvements of the Tardos scheme

Table: Asymptotics of  $L = \frac{\ell}{\ln n}$  for large  $n$ .

	Efficient constr.		Lower bounds	
Arbitrary attacks	$2c^2$	[ODS'13]	$2c^2$	[HM'12]
Interleaving attack	$2c^2$	[ODS'13]	$2c^2$	[HM'12]
All-1 attack	$O(c^{1.5})$	[ODS'13]	$\Omega(c)$	
Minority voting	$O(c^{1.5})$	[ODS'13]	$\Omega(c)$	
Majority voting	$O(c^{1.5})$	[ODS'13]	$\Omega(c)$	
Coin-flip attack	$O(c^{1.5})$	[ODS'13]	$\Omega(c)$	



# Results

## Results from group testing

Table: Asymptotics of  $L = \frac{\ell}{\ln n}$  for large  $n$ .

	Efficient constr.		Lower bounds	
Arbitrary attacks	$2c^2$	[ODS'13]	$2c^2$	[HM'12]
Interleaving attack	$2c^2$	[ODS'13]	$2c^2$	[HM'12]
All-1 attack	$ec$	[C+'11]	$\log_2(e)c$	[Seb'85]
Minority voting	$O(c^{1.5})$	[ODS'13]	$\Omega(c)$	
Majority voting	$O(c^{1.5})$	[ODS'13]	$\Omega(c)$	
Coin-flip attack	$O(c^{1.5})$	[ODS'13]	$\Omega(c)$	

# Results

## Contributions

Table: Asymptotics of  $L = \frac{\ell}{\ln n}$  for large  $n$ .

	Efficient constr.		Lower bounds	
Arbitrary attacks	$2c^2$	[ODS'13]	$2c^2$	[HM'12]
Interleaving attack	$2c^2$	[ODS'13]	$2c^2$	[HM'12]
All-1 attack	$2c$	[Laa'13]	$\log_2(e)c$	[Seb'85]
Minority voting	$2c$	[Laa'13]	$\Omega(c)$	
Majority voting	$\pi c$	[Laa'13]	$\Omega(c)$	
Coin-flip attack	$4c$	[Laa'13]	$\Omega(c)$	

## Conclusion

### **If you do know the pirate strategy...**

- ...you can find pirates much faster!
- Trick: Optimize  $g$ , then optimize and fix  $p$
- Code length often linear in  $c$ , decreases linearly in  $q$
- Applications to group testing

### **If you don't know the pirate strategy...**

- ...use the interleaving defense, also dynamically!
- Statically optimal, dynamically possibly optimal(?)
- Seems to work well in practice (simulations)

Questions?